Sen’s Idea of Justice versus Rawls’ Theory of Justice by Sebastiano Maffettone
Institute for 
Human
Development
INDIAN JOURNAL OF 
H U M A N  
D E V E L O P M E N T
INDIAN
JOURNAL
OF 
HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT
Madhusudan Ghosh
Jandhyala B.G. Tilak
Pravat Kumar Kuri and Arindam Laha
Keith Dowding
Roberto Alejandro
Sebastiano Maffettone
James P. Sterba 
Charles W. Mills
Valerian Rodrigues
Aakash Singh Rathore
Philip Pettit
Christian Schemmel
Evan Riley
O.A. Oyeshile
Udaya S. Mishra
M.H. Suryanarayana
 Regional Disparities in Education, 
Health and Human Development in India
 What Matters for
Outcomes in Elementary Education in India?
 Financial Inclusion 
and Human Development in India: An Inter-State Analysis
 What Is the Idea of Justice?
 Towards a Hermeneutics of Justice: 
Reflections on Amartya Sen's Philosophy
 Sen's Idea of
Justice versus Rawls' Theory of Justice
What Sen Should Have Said to Rawls
 Re-Theorizing Justice: Some Comments
on Amartya Sen's The Idea of Justice
 Justice as the Lens: Interrogating
Rawls through Sen and Ambedkar
 The Romance of Global Justice? 
Sen's Deparochialization and the Quandary of Dalit Marxism
 A Question for Sen
about Democracy and Justice
 Sen, Rawls—and Sisyphus
 Against Sen Against Rawls on Justice
 Sen's Realization-Focused
Notion of Justice and the Burden of
Democratic Governance in African Societies
 On Adjusting the Survivorship
Dimension in the Human Development Index
 New Estimates of Poverty in India: A 
Critique of the 'Tendulkar Committee Report'—A Response
Symposium on
PERSPECTIVE 
RESPONSE
BOOK REVIEWS
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE
V
o
lu
m
e
 5
        N
u
m
b
e
r 1
       J
a
n
u
a
ry
-J
u
n
e
 2
0
1
1
I
N
D
IA
N
 J
O
U
R
N
A
L
 O
F
 H
U
M
A
N
 D
E
V
E
L
O
P
M
E
N
T
Volume 5 Number 1 January-June 2011INDIAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Volume 5                                                               Number 1 January-June 2011
Institute for Human Development
NIDM Building, IIPA Campus, IP Estate
New Delhi-110 002
Phones: +91-11-2335 8166/ 2332 1610
Fax: +91-11-2376 5410
Email: ijhd@ihdindia.org
Website: www.ihdindia.org
The Indian Journal of Human Development:
welcomes original inter-disciplinary contributions from a 
human development perspective on developing countries
promotes fresh debates on concepts and measurement 
of human development
explores the inter-connections between policy 
interventions and impacts on the lives of people
includes a comparative analysis of development policies 
that enhance people's freedoms
offers human development insights into policy analysis 
and evaluation
The Journal includes scholarly essays and short comments, lectures 
and orations, reflections and perspectives, book reviews, 
information on events and statistics relating to human 
development. Expressions of all shades and opinions are welcome.
>
>
>
>
>
9 7 7 0 9 7 3 7 0 3 0 0 0
I SSN  09 7 3 - 7 0 3 0
Subscription Rates
Sen’s Idea of Justice versus 
Rawls’ Theory of Justice
Sebastiano Maffettone*
In ‘The Idea of Justice’, Amartya Sen presents an alternative approach to Rawls' theory of justice. 
The core argument is reformulated as a criticism of the neglect (by Rawls) of what Sen himself 
calls ‘nyaya’ in favour of the opposite ‘niti’. According to Sen, Rawls' niti-centred approach, 
being merely institutional, under-estimates the necessary combination of just institutions 
and correspondent actual behaviours that make a society reasonably just. Sen consequently 
champions the opposite nyaya-centred approach, according to which ‘what happens to people’ 
must be a central concern for a theory of justice. To my advice, this argument is dependent on 
Sen’s old idea, according to which the ‘primary goods’ basis of Rawls' approach to distributive 
justice is flawed and must be substituted by an approach in terms of capabilities. I instead 
think that the capability approach to a general theory of justice presents both epistemic and 
ethical problems of paramount importance. These problems are similar to the ones created by 
the necessity to rely on interpersonal comparisons when we move within the utilitarian tradition.
Keywords: The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen, John Rawls
In his recent book, The Idea of Justice1, Amartya Sen presents a new theory of justice 
in polemics with the mainstream tradition. Sen’s book is an enormously wide-
ranging work and the domain of theories of justice that he refers to is complex and 
differentiated. There is no doubt, however, that the tradition of theories of justice that 
Sen has in mind has been inaugurated and dominated by the political philosophy of 
John Rawls. Therefore, it seems correct to conceive this book as an attempt to construct 
an alternative approach to Rawls' theory of justice. One could say that Sen tries to make 
a similar critical move against Rawls which the latter undertook, quite successfully, 
against utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice. In other words, Sen here attempts to put 
forward an alternative to the dominant theory of justice by critically engaging with it. 
Sen himself recognizes that Rawls' has been ‘the most influential theory of justice in 
modern moral philosophy’ (p. 59) and the second chapter of this book is devoted to 
‘Rawls and Beyond’ (with the first chapter being mainly methodological). That is why 
it seems natural to assess the success of Sen’s account in terms of the significance and 
effectiveness of his criticism of Rawls. To put it in the simplest way, did he present in 
this book a theory of justice, which shows Rawls' limitations in being able, at the same 
time, to exhibit a more powerful alternative. My answer to this question is ‘No! He 
didn’t.’ The negative answer is, however, only partially negative. In fact, I think that 
Sen provides many arguments against Rawls' theory of justice, some of which rather 
persuasive. To be less vague, from my point of view, the core argument that Sen uses 
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against Rawls is not satisfying, but there are side arguments that can provide useful 
re-adjustments from within the Rawlsian paradigm and maybe even beyond it.
This core argument is elegantly reformulated as a criticism of the neglect (by Rawls) 
of what Sen himself calls in Sanskrit nyaya—following an Indian legacy—in favour of 
the opposite niti. The niti–nyaya distinction ranges over (at least) two disagreements. 
The first disagreement concerns the difference between the transcendental and the 
comparative: Rawls discusses what a perfectly just society should do, whereas for 
Sen, the most important problems that we need to confront are comparative problems, 
concerning ways of moving toward societies that are less unjust. The second 
disagreement concerns the role of institutions: for Rawls, justice is essentially about 
institutions and the particular distributions of goods are derivatively just if they are 
produced by just institutions; Sen, on the contrary, thinks that justice is essentially 
about how well or badly off individuals actually are. I do not see particular difficulties 
with the first disagreement. It is possible to consider actual unjust situations from a 
transcendental standpoint. That is why I will concentrate on the second disagreement.
According to Sen, Rawls' niti-centred approach, being merely institutional, under-
estimates the necessary combination of just institutions and correspondent actual 
behaviours that make a society reasonably just. Sen consequently champions the 
opposite nyaya-centred approach, according to which ‘what happens to people’ must 
be a central concern for a theory of justice. To my advice, this argument is dependent 
on Sen’s old idea, according to which the ‘primary goods’ basis of Rawls' approach 
to distributive justice is flawed and must be substituted by an approach in terms of 
capabilities, even if curiously enough, Sen seems to think that this distinction is not so 
basic (p. 66). I instead think that the capability approach to a general theory of justice 
presents both epistemic and ethical problems of paramount importance. But before 
analysing these problems, we need to take a detour, given the complex nature of Sen’s 
arguments against Rawls in this book.
I. To be fair (if this word can be so naively used here), Sen recognizes that several 
positive lessons can be learnt from the Rawlsian approach. He also ends the book 
by arguing that he forcefully distanced his own argument from that of Rawls due to 
his academic habit of emphasizing distinctions more than affinities, but that his real 
intention is, after all, to follow a parallel path2. For Sen, the main positive lessons to be 
learnt from Rawls are connected with the following points:
1. The idea that fairness is central to justice;
2. The thesis about the objectivity of practical reason;
3. The distinction between the ‘reasonable’ and the ‘rational’, and more generally, 
the reconstruction of the moral powers of persons as related to their capacity for a 
‘sense of justice’ and a ‘conception of the good’;
4. The separate and over-riding concern for liberty (as compared with other primary 
goods);
5. The insistence on a ‘fair equality of opportunities’ as an enrichment of the literature 
on inequality;
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6. The need for according special attention to the worst-off people; and
7. The way in which primary goods are conceived, which gives people the opportunity 
to do what they would like with their own lives.
All these points permit us to say that Sen has in common with Rawls “an important 
shared involvement in being concerned with justice in the first place” (p. 413). 
There are, of course, certain critical points that Sen sees in Rawls' theory of justice. 
Also Sen offers numerous criticisms of Rawls, so much so that sometimes we find it 
difficult to understand wherein lies the true difference between these two authors. 
Sen starts by separating what he calls ‘problems that can be addressed effectively’ (p. 
65), within the Rawlsian account, from what are defined as ‘difficulties that need fresh 
investigation’ (p. 66). This distinction implies that the problems in the first category 
can be re-elaborated within the Rawlsian scheme whereas those in the second category 
cannot and need an alternative approach. Among the problems in the first category, 
the following two deserve special attention:
1. The extreme nature of the priority of liberty as conceived by Rawls, and already 
emphasized by Herbert Hart shortly after the publication of A Theory of Justice. 
There can be some priority of liberty but not total unconstrained priority. Here 
the example—presented by Sen on p. 65—of hunger and starvation considered as 
being worse than a loss of liberty seems inappropriate, because in order to attain 
Rawls' principles of justice one needs to have realized the so-called ‘circumstances 
of justice’ that include moderate scarcity. Given that moderate scarcity is an 
ambiguous expression— raising the question as to whether rural India reaches the 
line of moderate scarcity—one should remember that Rawls makes the priority 
of liberty depend on a minimum average economic well-being of the population. 
This implies that the priority of liberty does not apply where conditions of hunger 
and starvation are normal.
2. The fact that Rawls does not provide a way by which primary goods can be 
converted into good living. In this sense, for Sen, capabilities work better than 
primary goods, albeit not representing a ‘foundational departure’ (p. 66) from 
Rawls' programme. This last comment seems an understatement in the light of 
Sen’s whole argument against Rawls.
Of course, the hard core of Sen’s criticism is supposed to rely on the difficulties 
which cannot be solved within the Rawlsian paradigm. Among them we can list the 
following difficulties:
1. The relevance of actual behaviour which Rawls is supposed to under-estimate. 
This problem depends on the strong institutionalism that according to Sen, Rawls 
is committed to. His theory of justice sees the ‘basic structure of society’ as its 
primary subject. As a consequence, the emphasis is on just institutions rather than 
on a ‘just society’, with the latter being linked to the actual behaviour of people. 
As we have already seen, this problem can be also placed in terms of a distinction 
between a niti approach (Rawls) and a nyaya approach (Sen);
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2. The contractualist approach, which tends to be too limiting (here, I would prefer 
to apply the term ‘contractualist’ to ‘contractarian’, used by Sen, for the Kant–
Rawls tradition, leaving the term ‘contractarian’ for Hobbes’ tradition). Sen claims 
that the contractualist tradition cannot accommodate the following significant 
possibilities: 
- Dealing with comparative assessments instead of identifying transcendental 
solutions;
- emphasizing social realizations (beyond institutionalism);
- accepting incompleteness in social assessments (a partial ordering can also be 
alright), and removing manifest cases of injustice on this basis; and 
- considering voices beyond the contractualist group that avoid parochialism.
3. The last point listed in (ii) above implies laying a stress on the relevance of global 
perspectives beyond all that constrains the pursuit of justice within the limits of a 
determined polity.
Sen pursues all the above criticisms in a long and often detailed manner, which 
makes it practically impossible to make proper sense of all them here. Still, the most 
relevant accusations against Rawls can conflate within the niti–nyaya distinction: it is 
not possible to identify just institutions without making them contingent on the actual 
behaviour of people. This is, in fact. the reason why Sen’s readers are invited to firmly 
reject Rawls' transcendental institutionalism in the name of Sen’s realization-focused 
comparativism (p. 7). It is also interesting to note that some form of anti-institutionalism 
is typical within the scope of political theory as practised in the Indian academic world. 
The premise could be either that a weak civil society needs care before entering into 
the political domain or that institutions recall the State and that the State is seen by 
many Indian authors as a byproduct of colonialism. 
II. It is indeed hard to make a choice between transcendental institutionalism and 
realization-focused comparativism because, as I said, Sen inflates his thesis with an 
enormously large number of arguments (whose total is supposed to count against 
that by Rawls). This makes it extremely difficult to adjudicate the case. For example, 
it is doubtful to say, as Sen does, that transcendental institutionalism makes the 
relevance of the global impossible, given that there are many authors like Thomas 
Pogge, who are simultaneously globalist and institutionalist. The idea according to 
which democracy as the exercise of public reason (that is the way in which Sen defines 
democracy) is excluded by the Rawlsian approach is also highly questionable. This 
criticism originates in a well-known criticism by Habermas of Rawls, as elaborated 
by the 1995 exchange between the two in the Journal of Philosophy. Elsewhere, I have 
tried to show how controversial Habermas’ point is and how it can also be transitively 
extended to Sen’s point (see Habermas, 1995, pp. 109-31; Maffettone, 2010, chapter 7). 
Finally, Sen’s main criticism—the one based on the niti–nyaya distinction—seems to 
put together the following three different arguments:
1. A kind of anti-institutionalism à la G.A. Cohen;
2. A thesis against Rawls' purely ideal theory-based approach; and
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3. The idea that ‘resourcism’ is insufficient because we should rather consider the 
resources–persons relationship (this is similar to the classical capabilities versus 
primary goods argument, as made by Sen). 
It is also worth noting that the Cohen-like approach—as per point (i) above—
requires more ‘ideal theory’ and less connection with the facts (it requires facts-free 
principles). It thus goes in the opposite direction of the claim for realism made under 
point (ii) above. 
However, my remarks here are not intended to minimize the impact of Sen’s 
arguments. It is probably true that a social contract approach à la Rawls makes global 
legitimation hard. And the strong liberal institutionalism of Rawls can actually make 
the integration with democracy as deliberation more difficult than necessary. On this 
last point, Sen devotes a whole chapter to show how the social choice-based approach 
is much better than the social contract approach. Frankly, I doubt whether Sen has 
demonstrated here that the social choice theory and democratic deliberation go so 
well together, but again this is not the real focus of the controversy, which, I repeat, 
corresponds to the niti–nyaya distinction mentioned above. Sen’s main criticism stands 
or falls with it. That is why in the following discussion, I will try to reduce Sen’s 
mountain of criticisms against Rawls to a smaller but decisive problem. In so doing, 
my intention is to show that the therapy (Sen’s alternative) creates more problems 
than the initial supposed disease (Rawls' position). 
III. In order to proceed in this direction, I claim that the first two parts of Sen’s pro-
nyaya anti-niti argument can be substantially reduced to the third one: Cohen’s 
anti-institutionalism and the objections to a mere ideal theory-based approach, are 
dependent on—and anyway secondary to— the ‘resources’ versus ‘resources related 
to people’ (id est capabilities) thesis. In other words, both these criticisms converge 
into the third, according to which Rawls defends institutionalism too easily by making 
extremely strong assumptions on the post-contract behaviour of the persons and 
assumptions that are less strong than necessary on the pre-contract attitudes. This 
erroneous path can be avoided only by taking persons seriously in a more direct way. 
To sum up all these arguments, and to reduce them to one, we could say that Sen’s 
main disagreement with Rawls lies in the thesis that fairness should also properly 
apply to persons whereas Rawls' principles apply only to institutions. And this is 
exactly why the capability thesis reproaches the resourcist approach à la Rawls. 
If we look at Chapter 12 of this book, entitled ‘Capabilities and Resources’, we can 
see how this opposition is relevant for Sen. Here, resources are considered as being 
analogous to wealth, with both being “not something we value for its own sake” (p. 
253). Capabilities, on the other hand, being linked with substantive freedom, focus on 
the actual ability to do different things that a person values. For example, a person with 
a large amount of wealth cannot be considered advantaged if she suffers from a severe 
disability. Rawls's primary goods—and more generally all resourcist approaches—
are for Sen ‘feticist’ because they wrongly consider primarily means where they 
should rather consider ends. For Sen, this mistake becomes transparent if we examine 
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poverty. Poverty cannot be properly understood just in terms of income (or wealth, for 
that matter). Of course, an index of primary goods represents a vector, which is why it 
includes more than income (or wealth), but its analysis is still guided by a ‘search for 
general all purpose means’ (p. 254). Sen claims that this is wrong because what really 
counts is the way in which different persons convert income or primary goods (more 
generally, resources) into good living. thus, poverty is contingent upon the different 
characteristics of people and of the environment in which they live. Disabilities 
constitute another relevant example because they clearly point to a difficulty in the 
conversion of resources into capabilities. Poverty and disabilities instantiate an evident 
‘conversion handicap’ (p. 258). The thesis, however, aims to be more general, and does 
not apply only to them.
This thesis makes Sen sceptical about Rawls' difference principle, which notoriously 
concentrates upon primary goods to settle distributional issues. The idea here is that 
even if Rawls recommends—in line with a ‘principle of redress’—correctives for 
‘special needs’, this is not enough because the problem of the conversions of primary 
goods (and generally resources) into good living is structural and ubiquitous. That 
is why this very problem implies a “departure from Rawlsian theory” (p. 262). This 
departure is directed toward a theory—like the capability theory (unlike that in 
resourcism)—in which the focus is on the ends rather than the means.
Given these premises, it is not surprising that Sen—in Chapter 13—takes into 
consideration happiness in its relationship with well-being and capabilities. In fact, 
here we have a kind of utilitarian turn, implied by Sen’s main argument (that is, the 
nyaya versus niti argument). After all, the main characteristic of utilitarianism consists 
in focusing on the relationships between goods and persons, whose psychological 
reactions in terms of happiness are what eventually count. Moreover, Sen stresses 
the importance of outcomes and realizations in opposition to Rawls's preference for 
the centrality of an interpersonal agreement. And such a difference approximates the 
traditional distinction between the utilitarian and contractualist outlooks. 
Sen indeed recognizes that the recent emphasis of economic science on happiness—
with which he sympathizes—has origins in the once-dominant utilitarian tradition, 
and here the anti-Rawlsianism reaches its climax. He also points out that a “substantial 
part of welfare economics is still largely utilitarian” (p. 272). These admissions are 
not surprising, because if one is in search of ends rather than means, happiness is a 
plausible final destination, simply because it is by definition an ultimate goal. 
This conclusion prima facie seems to give us some advantage, but on reflection, it 
is difficult to ignore its inconveniences, which are epistemic and ethical–political, and 
can be summed up in the following contention—unless we know people’s values and 
tastes, which is improbable, there is a significant risk of paternalism when we consider 
happiness as the last word in this argument3. This is why –in A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
contrasts his liberalism with a liberalism of happiness, which is a kind of perfectionist 
and paternalistic vision. In the book, Sen himself admits the risk of paternalism, and 
also quotes Richard Layard in this sense (see Layard, 2005). It is also easy to observe 
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that the happiness economics shares the danger of paternalism and consequently 
creates, for a liberal, problems that are analogous to the ones implied by utilitarianism 
(as shown by Rawls in A Theory of Justice). 
I will come back to the danger of paternalism later, a danger that I think is implicit 
not only in the very notion of happiness, but rather in the whole capability approach 
because here I prefer to focus on Sen’s trajectory in the book. Sen, in fact, seems alert 
about this danger, in particular when (pp 277 and ff) he tracks the origins of welfare 
economics in the desire to separate itself from utilitarianism. The reason for this desire 
can no doubt be found in the will to attain more epistemic abstinence, due to the fact 
that interpersonal comparisons of utility imply value judgments and are often difficult 
to assess. Sen easily dismisses by stressing that we normally compare “joys and pains 
of human life” (p. 277). What seems strange is that he does not consider the hypothesis 
that in so doing, he is here defending something (social choice plus interpersonal 
comparisons) that is similar to utilitarianism as opposed to Rawlsian liberalism. Of 
course, in order to distinguish his position from utilitarianism, Sen claims to be anti-
welfarist, a position that he considers not narrowly confined to the utilities. But we are 
still within a utilitarian framework in the broad sense. 
Sen devotes a section (pp. 279 and ff) to the way in which welfare economics 
separated itself from utilitarianism, following Lionel Robbins’ first (epistemic) 
criticisms of utilitarianism. In this process, welfare economics took the form of the 
social choice theory à la Arrow, an approach that Sen masters better than anyone else. 
In his seminal book, Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow, quoted by Sen 
(p. 279), formulated the viewpoint according to which ‘interpersonal comparisons of 
utilities have no meaning’. This implies that the levels of utility or happiness cannot 
be compared among different people. And all these informational restrictions leave 
us—within the realm of welfare economics—with a set of decision procedures that are 
roughly similar to voting (p. 280). This conclusion implies that within classic welfare 
economics, we cannot make any use of the happiness metric to discuss inequality and 
equity. Sen does not accept this prudent conclusion. In order to avoid it, he reconsiders 
some of his own past work on collective choice theory, in particular the part in which 
he connected Arrow’s impossibility result to the meaninglessness of the interpersonal 
comparability within Arrow’s paradigm. 
Since the 1970s, Sen has given a strategy to take Arrow’s impossibility seriously 
and to look for devices that would enable us to avoid it. Within this strategy, enriching 
the informational basis of the collective choice procedure seems a necessary step. 
This move, of course, relocates us in proximity to the utilitarian tradition. However, 
Sen—and here he separates himself from full and simple utilitarianism—thinks that 
utilitarianism is not a good guide in this direction due to the fact that utilitarianism 
limits its informational apparatus to welfare information. Welfarism, however, is 
troubling for Sen, particularly because it neglects all information concerning freedom 
and agency. Moreover, the utilitarian calculus, based on happiness and desire 
fulfilment, can be unfair toward “those who are persistently deprived” (p. 282). These 
people can, in fact, cultivate adaptive preferences, tending to adjust their desires to 
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actual circumstances to make their life more bearable. In this way, we cannot rely on 
the interpersonal comparisons of utilities based on their natural preferences. 
Sen points out that the very concept of capability is supposed to overcome this 
difficulty by taking into consideration well-being in the optics of substantive freedom. 
This result derives from the fact that for Sen, an assessment of capabilities must start 
with two important distinctions: firstly, between freedom and agency; and secondly, 
between freedom and achievement. This dynamics introduces procedural elements 
connected with fairness in an otherwise consequentialist (albeit not welfarist) 
paradigm. I do not doubt that taking note of agency achievements or agency freedom 
“shifts the focus away from seeing a person as just a vehicle of well-being” (p. 288), 
thereby permitting Sen a detachment from what could be generally interpreted as 
a quasi-utilitarian framework. But perhaps this is not the point. The problem here 
consists rather in seeing whether the shift Sen that takes from means to ends, from 
procedures to outcomes, from epistemic prudence to the acceptance of interpersonal 
comparisons, still allows one to remain immune to some of the risks that are usually 
connected with utilitarianism. 
Curiously enough, these risks have been stressed in the past by both Sen and 
Rawls. In Chapter 8 of his masterful book, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1970), 
Sen faces the usual conundrum of avoiding Arrow’s impossibility by starting with 
problems of distributive justice from the point of view of the collective choice theory. 
His strategy is based on the idea of enriching the information available to the decision-
makers. This enrichment of information is usually connected with the measurability 
of individual welfare (this measure can be ordinal or cardinal) and the interpersonal 
comparability of these judgements (that can either be admitted or not admitted in 
the calculus), not speaking here of the form of the function we take in consideration 
(see p. 118 and ff of Collective Choice and Social Welfare [CCSW]). In theory, we could 
enrich information in two ways: either by assuming cardinal measurability of the 
preferences or by allowing interpersonal comparability among the decision-makers. 
After a powerful demonstrative tour de force, however, Sen concludes that what really 
counts are interpersonal comparisons: even if we use the cardinal instead of ordinal 
measure, like Arrow did, Arrow’s impossibility is still there. “The crucial difference 
lies in introducing comparability” (CCSW, p. 124), which means, for example, that 
ordinal comparability can bypass Arrow’s impossibility whereas cardinal non-
comparability cannot. Rawls' original maximin solution introduces a limited ordinal 
comparability whereas utilitarianism is in favour of complete cardinal comparability. 
Now, it seems that Sen’s argument for capabilities moves toward this second option. 
But, as Sen himself has shown many times, such informational basis is epistemically 
very demanding.
The main problem with interpersonal comparisons is, however, not epistemic but 
rather ethical–political, at least if one moves within a broadly speaking liberal horizon. 
This is the reason why I spoke of paternalism. The large quantity of information that 
the nyaya approach requires is not usually available, and on many occasions, can be 
imposed from outside (actually this is so except in extraordinary cases, which I will 
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come back to later). Such a conclusion makes us understand the main danger of this 
approach. If the nyaya approach implies a paternalistic imposition of preferences upon 
the individual decision-makers, then the autonomy of people is at risk. Obviously 
paternalism is at odds with liberalism. I am just stressing that Sen’s nyaya approach 
approximates paternalism, whereas a more prudent niti approach is more naturally 
coherent with liberalism. 
This conclusion is not particularly surprising, if not for other reasons than because 
Rawls timidly formulated a similar analysis in Political Liberalism, and Sen himself 
partly recognizes such a danger in this book. In the Lecture V of Political Liberalism, 
Rawls aims to show that the choice of an index of primary goods as a reference for his 
own second principle of justice depends on what he calls a ‘political conception’. The 
political conception that Rawls has in mind is a liberal conception whose fundamental 
goal consists in defending pluralism within the limits of stability. Within this 
perspective, justice as fairness has to reject “the idea of comparing and maximizing 
overall well being in matters of political justice” (Political Liberalism [PL], p 188). This 
is why primary goods imply some general means that are able to satisfy the needs of 
citizens when questions of justice arise. Such a construct depends—within a liberal 
political conception like that of Rawls—on a thin theory of the good, with the intention 
of preserving the (liberal) autonomy of the citizens. To do otherwise would imply 
the use of a comprehensive doctrine, which is exactly what a political conception à la 
Rawls is supposed to avoid. 
Now, there is no doubt that an index of primary goods like that of Rawls “does 
not approximate very accurately what many people must want and value as judged 
by their comprehensive views” (PL, p. 189). But here incompleteness is the price 
we pay for neutrality. The trade-off between liberty and preference satisfaction is 
meant to avoid paternalism within the political ambit. It presupposes—as Rawls 
says—“a social division of responsibility” (PL, p. 189), within which the political 
sphere provides general omni-potential means while the rest—including some very 
significant ends—are left to individuals and associations. To do otherwise—as every 
liberal person knows—would imply politically imposing, via coercion if necessary, 
what are perhaps important but surely controversial ends. Putting it bluntly, to claim 
that politics should pursue fundamental ends would be to misrepresent politics like a 
form of applied ethics. This is not so, within a liberal political conception like that of 
Rawls, in which the priority of the political makes it partially independent from the 
claims of ethics. Only individual persons, and their free associations, and not political 
institutions, can take responsibility for their ends. 
In his book, Sen is not unaware of this problem, even if he under-estimates its 
ethical–political relevance. In Chapter 14 of the book, he uses the capability approach 
to comparatively assess the well-being of persons. This leaves room for many other, 
mainly procedural, concerns. In a footnote (p. 297), Sen also includes among these 
other concerns, which are, according to himself, part of Rawls' conception, “personal 
liberties and the need for fair procedures”. Fair enough! one could say, if not for the fact 
that there could be a conflict between the general logic of the capability approach and 
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these other concerns. According to Sen (and again the reference here is to Rawls' theory 
of justice), “the contrast between primary goods and capabilities is in a limited arena” 
(p. 299) and only there. The rest, in particular the status of liberty and the demands of 
procedural fairness, can be left to Rawls' theory. Now, my question is: Is this possible 
and plausible? Perhaps not. The very logic of capabilities could be in conflict with 
the logic of political liberalism, due to the fact that political liberalism requires one 
to avoid the interpretation of people’s ends. Sen, via capabilities, transforms (in part) 
politics into a form of applied ethics wherein the good dictates the nature of the right. 
This is more or less like what the utilitarians do, and that is at odds with liberalism. 
This is also the reason why Sen’s nyaya-based approach in the end runs the risk of 
paternalism.
IV. Having said all this, I must admit that, even if I remain unconvinced by Sen’s 
general argument, there is still a part of it that could well integrate a liberal vision like 
that of Rawls. My thesis presupposes that people’s preferences and desires, especially 
if we have in mind large numbers, are generally opaque. Perhaps you can successfully 
try to share some of your goods among your offspring, assuming that in this case, you 
have a deep personal knowledge of the people concerned. However, to operate in a 
similar way with the entire population of a polity, for example if you were the Ministry 
of the Treasure, when one would be working under a “thick veil of ignorance”, would 
preposterous and risky. This is why any effort to try to realize ends where people 
are concerned, such as comparing their different tastes and values via politics—like 
Sen wants—implies some form of paternalism and can be taken as being anti-liberal. 
However, it is not always so. There are cases in which the desires and preferences of 
people do not look like opaque. If you think of situations of hunger and starvation or 
severe diseases, you understand why. In such cases, people’s desires and preferences 
are usually transparent: they just want food and to be cured. Here, it is easy and not 
paternalistic to guess what people want and consequently to argue that we should 
try to help them convert their needs into new substantive opportunities. Sometimes, 
it could even be wrong to try not to interpret people needs: for instance, if one were 
to arrive at Dachau in 1945, it would not need a special ability to understand that 
prisoners must be helped! 
This is another way of saying something more general: that to make public sense 
of interpersonal comparisons, we need some a priori consensus, like when ‘urgency’—
to use a well-known term of Thomas Scanlon—is at the stake. When we make 
interpersonal comparisons, we compare the goodness of the individual i in situation 
A with the goodness of the individual j in situation B. The question here concerns 
the way in which judgements of this type must be conceived. The problem with 
utilitarianism in assessing these judgments lies in its dependency on the subjective 
experiences of i and j. We are familiar with examples in which i is depressed whereas 
j is a sort of utility monster. All these imaginary possibilities render the utilitarian 
way of making interpersonal comparisons arbitrary from a public point of view. This 
impression forces the thesis that we should rely on some objective standard other than 
the simple preferences of i and j themselves. 
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This is why public justification via interpersonal comparisons presupposes 
urgency, and (only) when there is urgency can we grasp the meaning of people 
conversion handicaps, and consequently, we can accept the idea that, for instance, 
disabled and hungry persons should be given more adequate “functionings” to live 
with. Here, the capability approaches work by avoiding the danger of paternalism4. 
In this light, it is not surprising that many of the examples cited by Sen concerning the 
limits of resourcism come from cases wherein we are confronted with persons who are 
affected either by severe diseases or by extreme poverty. 
The conclusion of the last paragraph offers the possibility of a reconciliation between 
the two paradigms that I have been discussing, namely those of Rawls and Sen. We can 
draw an imaginary line that separates the ‘normally cooperating members of society’ 
(Rawls) on one side from persons who are not so lucky, on the other side. Above this 
line, people can well be treated by liberal political theories à la Rawls. Underneath this 
line, however, it is not so. People living clearly underneath the line are doing so in 
conditions of ‘urgency’, and, therefore, deserve special attention, and for them liberal 
neutrality is not enough. The notion of ‘urgency’ or ‘importance’ implies a criterion 
through which we can objectively discriminate among strong preferences. Thomas 
Scanlon describes rather than defines urgency in terms of comparability among goods 
and satisfactions connected with them. For example, health is more important than 
amusement. Together with health and amusement, we have other concerns, and 
we can hypothesize in associating with them a multi-level scale wherein various 
combinations of such levels represent different levels of well-being. “The relation of 
urgency, then, will be a relation between various increments and decrements along 
one or more of these scales” (see Scanlon, 2003a.). Again Scanlon, commenting on 
the nature of (Rawlsian) contractualism, writes that “under contractualism …our 
attention is naturally directed first to those who would do worst” (see Scanlon, 2003b). 
He also presents this moral option of contractualism in contrast with the nature of 
utilitarianism, because the ‘losers’ are not sufficiently cared for within any utilitarian 
maximization of aggregate well-being. Rawls himself indeed goes in this direction 
when in Political Liberalism (pp. 184 and ff) he tries to meet Sen’s challenging objections 
to his own view of primary goods. But he never generalizes this thesis. 
The notion of urgency seems to be an attractive bridge between the views of Rawls 
and Sen. Urgency is presented by Scanlon under the edge of a doctrine that is capable 
of comparatively assessing benefits and burdens from the point of view of political 
morality. Thus conceived, this doctrine is required to satisfy the following three 
properties: (I) it must represent a kind of consensus among those to whom justification 
is addressed; (ii) it must allow for the fact that individuals have different tastes and 
interests; and (iii) it must be result-oriented. For Scanlon, such a doctrine cannot be 
formulated in terms of subjective criteria like many utilitarian would do so while 
basing their models on preference satisfaction. On the contrary, it requires an objective 
criterion that is coherent with our objective idea of moral judgement. Of course, we are 
required to declare on what basis we can discriminate among preferences of different 
persons. Urgency is one of these required bases. Urgency, as we have seen, is assessed 
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in terms of increments or decrements along the different scales on which we locate our 
concerns. The idea is that once we begin to understand the desirability of the benefits 
and the in-desirability of the burdens at stake, we can create a “hierarchy of relative 
urgency” Interestingly enough, this conception of urgency is rather like nyaya to use 
Sen’s terminology, in the sense that it depends on the comparisons among different 
lives in various contexts. Moreover, the example given by Scanlon focuses on those 
with “expensive medical needs” (see Scanlon, 2003a), which is altogether coherent 
with Sen’s vision. 
More generally, one could say that Rawlsian institutionalism can work like an 
obstacle when frontier questions (concerning the disabled, foreigners) are at stake. 
Take, for instance, global justice, an issue that Sen emphasizes. Here, the difficulties 
of a liberal Rawlsian paradigm—made evident by Thomas Nagel—derive from the 
necessity of this paradigm to neatly separate ethics from politics (see Nagel, “The 
Problem of Global Justice”, 2005, reprinted in Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the 
Religious Temperament, 2010). Within a Rawlsian view, political justice, that is, the main 
business of the theory, must be coherent with the basic structure of the society that 
it addresses. With this basic structure comprising a network of institutions, political 
justice presupposes reliable institutions. In the global domain, however, institutions 
are often not reliable from the point of view of justice. This makes the ethical appeal, 
which is implicit in the idea of justice, contrast with its political basis. While we know 
that global justice is needed, we do not know how to make it properly political.5 Sen 
indicates that the nyaya path can function here as a strategy emanating from our ethical 
intuitions, which are supposed to be in favour of global justice, to the construction of 
a renewed basic structure that is more coherent with global justice than the actual 
one. Sometimes, ethical evidence must anticipate the political structure. This applies, 
in a vague and provisional sense, whenever human inter-subjective relations create 
substantive problems of justice that are unable to receive an immediate institutional 
response. It is extremely pertinent in case of urgency (think, for instance, of the 
Holocaust). For a Rawlsian liberal, global justice signifies a case that fits the dialectics 
between ethics and politics that I have been alluding to. The indication we can draw 
from Sen is that in all these cases, we should take serious consideration of the relation 
between human needs—presupposing lives in contexts—and institutions. 
We could also investigate further and more general (going beyond urgency) 
possibilities of reconciliation between the paradigms of Rawls and Sen that I have 
discussed. While thinking of them, it is difficult to avoid the impression that Rawls' 
theory of justice comes from a wealthy nation, and is inevitably tied to its US origins. 
In a country like the US, protecting liberty as an individual choice is perhaps more 
important than elsewhere, for example, it could be more important than in rural India 
or Africa. This implies that whenever we expand the original Rawlsian paradigm from 
the US setting to other parts of the globe or to a particular region within it, we should 
be more careful in redesigning the relation between persons and institutions. This 
is, after all, what Sen recommends. It is almost superfluous to say that my intention 
in saying this is not to transform political theory in a kind of sophisticated moral 
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geography. It is rather an invitation to take history and tradition more seriously than 
many analytically trained political theorists usually do. I imagine indeed that such 
an argument would be coherent not only with Sen (from whom it is derived) but also 
with Rawls. If we carefully consider Rawls' vision of justice, we would note that the 
foundational concept of the basic structure must not be an invariant. It is rather a 
historical notion that presupposes a strong link between civil society and institutions. 
Finally, the social contract strategy à la Rawls proposes an objective criterion to 
discriminate among the preferences of different people. This criterion can be based 
on a hierarchy of relative urgency and can also be made wide enough to include a set 
of frontier situations. In difficult circumstances, we can comparatively assess people’s 
well-being in terms of nyaya, but coherently with a general liberal outlook. But, for the 
rest, we need to reject neither institutionalism nor contractualism. Perhaps, we can 
also use—albeit in quite a vague way—the nyaya approach to expand the possibilities 
associated with a too severe institutionalist approach in the direction of a more human 
centred view. Perhaps when we want to extend the natural ambit of Rawls' theory 
of justice, by applying it to problems of global justice, we must follow nyaya, or at 
least reformulate the fundamentals of the theory from the point of view of relations 
between people and institutions. In the light of Sen’s often inspiring book that I have 
been discussing, one could conclude by saying that even if a liberal should be normally 
coherent with a niti-based view, there are significant categories classes of cases in 
which it is not so and a liberal should become more coherent with a nyaya-based view. 
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NOTES 
1. Sen confronts himself with Rawls, whose main works considered here are A Theory of Justice, 
1971, and Political Liberalism, 1996 (second edition).
2. In some way, here—like in the rest of this book—Sen’s attitude toward Rawls is ambiguous: one 
never understands how much Sen is willing to distance his own approach from that of Rawls.
3. To be analytical, one should clearly separate the epistemic and the ethical–political side of 
paternalism. Unfortunately, such an internal distinction is not easy. It would, in fact, be complicated 
to go within the analysis of the epistemic side of the problem (one can get some help by reading 
Feldman, 2010) and would require elements of empirical psychology. In his Political Liberalism, 
Rawls, rather vaguely, connects the ‘burdens of judgments’ with pluralism. Here, I limit myself 
by arguing that we can assume some relation between the two aspects—epistemic and ethical–
political—of paternalism by going within the argument. I hope that this strategy can be forgiven, 
if one considers that I am not particularly interested here in the epistemic side of the issue.
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4. Perhaps we should distinguish between two different forms of paternalism. On one hand, we 
can have paternalism toward the victims, like for example, starving or disabled people. On the 
other hand, we can have paternalism toward the normal citizens, for example, if they are obliged 
to pay taxes to help starving or disabled people. In the second case, the risk of paternalism 
implies the compulsory transformation of a super-erogatory sentiment in an obligation, and 
consequently, runs the risk of over-demandingness.
5. Rawls himself says in A Theory of Justice, pp. 352-53, that when circumstances of justice are not 
realized and we are in severe distress, contractualism becomes very similar to utilitarianism.
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